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OPTIMAL HEDGING UNDER FORWARD-LOOKING BEHAVIOR 
Introduction 
With rare exceptions, previous work on hedging behavior has assumed a single production 
cycle. This implicitly assumes that the firm is myopic because such a firm is not concerned about 
events that occur after the end of the current production cycle. This assumption has been carried 
over from the risk and uncertainty literature and can be justified on the basis of simplicity. 
Danthine (1978), Holthausen (1979), and Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980) applied Sandmo's 
(1971) model of the myopic firm under uncertainty to analyze the behavior of the firm in the 
presence of a forward market for output They showed that the competitive risk -averse fum 
separates production from hedging decisions. They also proved that it is optimal to place a full 
hedge (i.e., to short hedge the entire production) if the forward price is unbiased. Otherwise, it is 
optimal to short hedge more (less) than total output when the forward price is greater than (less 
than) the expected cash price. 
A straightforward consequence of full-hedge optimality under unbiased forward prices is 
that most farmers should place full hedges most of the time based on empirical evidence that 
futures prices are not significantly biased [Telser (1958), Gray (1961), Just and Rausser (1981), 
Martin and Garcia (1981)]. But not all farmers hedge all oftheir output. Extensions to the myopic 
hedging model have been proposed that would explain this behavior. These studies include the 
introduction of production risk [Chavas and Pope (1982), Losq (1982), Honda (1983), Grant 
(1985)], basis risk [Batlin (1983), Paroush and Wolf (1989)], hedging costs [Chavas and Pope 
(1982)], hedging restrictions [Antonovitz and Roe (1986), Antonovitz and Nelson (1988)], and 
imperfect markets [Katz (1984)]. 
There are instances, however, for which the myopic assumption may lead to faulty 
conclusions about optimal hedging behavior. An example will help make this observation clear. 
Consider a finn only involved in speculative storage. Because no physical transformation of the 
commodity occurs, the price of ending inventories at one period will equal the input price for the 
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following period. Low output prices will then imply low input prices for subsequent storage. The 
positive (negative) effect of low (high) input prices for next period storage offsets the negative 
(positive) effect of low (high) output prices for this period storage, thereby reducing the need to 
hedge this period storage. 
Forward-looking hedging behavior was analyzed theoretically by Anderson and Danthine 
(1983) and Hey (1987). Anderson and Danthine allowed the finn to revise its hedging decisions 
during the production cycle but assumed a single production cycle. They showed that forward-
looking producers should separate production and hedging decisions but that producers should not 
hedge all of their output if the futures price is unbiased. Hey allowed for more than one production 
cycle and found that separation and suboptimality of full hedging hold. Hey's model was different 
from the one developed here because he assumed that (a) intertemporal utility is additive, (b) output 
cash prices are independently distributed and follow a constant distribution, and (c) sales decisions 
are taken after production and hedging decisions rather than simultaneously. Hey's results depend 
crucially on the sequential timing he imposed on sales, production, and hedging decisions. 
The purpose of this study is to formally demonstrate that the forward-looking optimal 
hedge is different from the myopic optimal hedge. We postulate a risk-averse firm that maximizes 
expected utility of terminal wealth and derive some propositions regarding optimal hedging 
behavior under both myopic and forward-looking hypotheses. Because the correlation between 
output and input prices is most obvious for speculative storage, we fust present results for the 
speculative fum that only stores and then for the fum that is involved in production and does not 
store. The last section reports the main conclusions from the analysis. 
A Theoretical Model of a Speculative Storing Competitive Firm 
Consider a competitive fum with a twice continuously differentiable von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function and assume that utility is strictly concave in its argument terminal 
wealth [U(WT), U'(Wr) > 0, U"(Wr) < 0]. Terminal wealth is 
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where Wt denotes monetary wealth at the end of trading date t, 1tt is cash flow at time t, and rt 
equals one plus the one-period interest rate prevailing at t. The interest rate need not be constant 
over time, but it is not random. At each trading date 0 $ t < T, the firm can borrow and lend 
unlimited amounts of money for one period at the prevailing interest rate. 
Input price randomness plays a key role in the model. But because of the mathematical 
complexity, little can be accomplished when we allow all prices to vary. We address this issue in 
two ways. First, we examine optimal behavior for a firm whose only productive activity is 
speculative storage. Because this firm sells the same product that it buys, the model is greatly 
simplified, allowing us to develop the intuition required for the second approach in which we 
introduce production. We solve the second approach by imposing some realistic restrictions on the 
technology set. 
Consider the case of the firm whose activities are storing a certain commodity to proftt from 
its resale and trading in a forward market for this product. I At any date t there are only two 
forward positions that can be negotiated: one for delivery at t+ 1 and the other for immediate 
delivery (i.e., delivery at t).2 We use Ft to denote the net short forward position for delivery at 
time t+ 1 open at date t. There are no restrictions on the amount or sign of the forward position 
held by the firm, except that the firm cannot have an open position for delivery at date T + 1 at the 
end of the terminal trading date (FT = 0), and that the firm cannot hold an open position for 
delivery at time t at the end of trading date t (F ~t = - Ft·l,t' where the first subscript denotes the 
opening date and the second denotes the delivery date).3 The cash flow from opening a forward 
I Employing a forward instead of a futures market allows us to isolate the effect of forward-looking behavior 
from that of basis risk. 
2we do not require actual delivery, but we still use this term for clarity of exposition. Forward 
commibnents may be canceled either by delivering the good or by undertaking an opposite transaction in the forward 
market. 
3This means that at any date 0,;; t < T firms have only one free choice regarding the two tradable positions 
in the forward market This choice is how much to commit for delivery (or receipt) a1 t+ I. 
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contract lags by one period because forward trades do not create cash flows until open positions 
are liquidated. The forward price prevailing at t for immediate delivery is identical to the current 
cash price (pt). The forward price at t for delivery at the following date t+ I (denoted by ft), 
however, will be generally different from the current cash price Pr 
Under the above specifications, the firm's cash flow at any date t :>Tis represented by 
where Pt represents product sales at date t, i(·) is a strictly convex storage cost function such that 
i'(-) > 0, and It is beginning inventory at date t. Positive sales means that the fum sells from 
beginning stocks, whereas negative sales means that the fum buys to store and sell at a later date. 
Sales cannot exceed beginning inventory (i.e., Pt :>It). The amount (It- Pt) is the unsold 
beginning inventory at date t, which is carried over at nonrandom storage cost i(~- Pt) to become 
beginning inventory at timet+ 1 (lt+1). 
We hypothesize that at any date 0 :> t :> T the fum selects the levels of sales (Pt) and 
hedging (Ft) that maximize expected utility of terminal wealth, given the available information. 
Optimal decisions at the current date t = 0 solve the following set of recursive equations 
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P, = (p,, f,), 
J2., = <Po····, P,). 
E,O denotes the expectation operator based on information available at t, the vector d, contains the 
firm's decision variables corresponding to date t, and the matrix .11, comprises the cash and futures 
prices up to (and including) timet. Terminal wealth is as defined in (1.1), and cash flows are 
given by (1.2). The solution to the problem summarized by expressions (1.3) and (1.4) can be 
obtained by recursively solving the Lagrangian functions 
where 11, is the Lagrangian multiplier. 
The first-order conditions (FOCs) corresponding to the terminal date (t = n are4 
(1.7) 
(1.8) 
where MT' denotes U' evaluated at the optimum. Condition (I. 7) requires that the Lagrangian 
multiplier (TJT) be strictly positive because (pT + i') MT' > 0. Hence, (IT- PT) must equal zero to 
satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker condition (1.8), i.e., the optimal sales policy at the terminal date is to sell 
all beginning inventories (PT =IT). Therefore, dT = (I'I' 0), the optimal cash flow for the terminal 
date reduces to 7t.r = PT IT+ (fT-l - pT) FT-l, and the maximum value function is 
4Recall that FT = 0 by assumption. 
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The FOCs for dates previous to the terminal time (0 ::; t < T) are (see Appendix A) 
ar 
(1.10) apt = rt+l ... rT-1 [rt (pt + i') Mt'- Et(Pt+l Mt+l')]- Tit= 0, 
t 
where Mt' = Et(Mt+l ')evaluated at the optimum corresponding to date t (note that Mt' > 0). The 
solution to expressions (1.10) through (1.12) is a unique absolute constrained maximum because 
the objective function is strictly concave, and the constraint set is convex.5 Expressions (1.9) 
through (1.12) provide the framework needed to analyze the behavior of the forward-looking risk-
averse firm. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is helpful to better define myopic and forward-
looking behavior. A myopic decision maker cares only about two dates: the present and one date 
in the future. Such an agent neglects the possibility of updating and/or taking decisions at all other 
times. Hence, in our notation the myopic firm is one making decisions at date T-1. Myopic 
behavior is inconsistent if the decision maker stays in the market for more than two trading dates. 
At the first trading date (T 1-1 ), the myopic agent behaves as if the next trading date (T 1) is the last 
one. But when date T1 arrives and the agent decides to stay in the market for one more trading 
time (denoted as T2), T1 becomes the trading date preceding the (new) terminal time T2, i.e., T1 is 
5we will assume for the remainder of the analysis that the solution to (1.3) and (1.4) exists. The 
conditions for this are given in Bertsekas (1976, p. 375). 
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now T 2-l. In other words, T 1 is the tenninal date from the perspective of Tc I, but it is not 
terminal when the firm is at T 1. 
The inconsistency of myopic behavior arises as follows. By FOCs (1.7) and (1.8), we 
know that E.r
1
_1(PT1) = IT1, and by FOCs (1.10) through (1.12) we know that there is a positive 
probability of PT
2
_1 < IT2.1 and that it is impossible to have PT2.1 > IT2.1. But decision dates T1 
and T 2-1 correspond to the same calendar date, hence the expectation of next-period sales is always 
upwardly biased. The bias occurs because the firm expects next-date sales to match beginning 
inventories, but when the next date actually arrives the firrn sometimes finds it optimal not to sell 
the entire beginning stock. In contrast, a forward-looking (or nonmyopic) firm is any firm making 
decisions at t < T-1 and that cares about at least two dates in the future at which time it will revise 
decisions. 
To summarize, a myopic firrn can be defined as one whose planning horizon is the same as 
its decision horizon [Merton (1982, p. 656)].6 A forward-looking fum, in contrast, is one whose 
planning horizon comprises at least two decision horizons. There are striking differences in the 
qualitative behavior of forward- looking fums compared to myopic fums, and this is the issue 
addressed in most of what follows. 
It is necessary to know the determinants of the optimal physical decisions (i.e., the 
variables that affect optimal storage I1 or, equivalently, optimal sales Po). The main results 
regarding this issue are summarized in Proposition I. 
PROPOSffiON 1: STORAGE AND SALES BEHAVIOR. In the presence of a forward market, 
optimal storage (or sales) for a risk-averse firm is determined independently from the subjective 
joint distribution of random variables, from the decision maker's degree of risk aversion, and from 
the optimal hedging decision. If positive, optimal storage is such that discounted current forward 
6 According to Merton, the planning horizon "is the maximum length of time for which the investor gives 
any weight in his utility function," and decision horizon is "the length of time between which the investor makes 
successive decisions, and it is the minimum time between which he would take any action." 
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price equals current cash price plus marginal storage cost. These results hold for both myopic and 
forward-looking firms. 
Proof According to FOC (1.11), at the optimum the equality 
holds. Substituting (1.13) into FOC (1.10) and rearranging yields 
Hence: 
a. If f0 < r0 [p0 + i'(O)], then llo > 0, and therefore I1 = 0. 
b. If f0 = r0 [p0 + i'(O)], then llo = I1 = 0. 
c. If f0 > r0 [p0 + i'(O)], then llo = 0, and therefore I1 > 0 satisfying f0 = r0 [p0 + i'(I1)]. Q.E.D. 
Proposition I shows that separation between physical and hedging decisions is a robust 
result because it holds for both myopic and forward-looking decision makers. Our findings extend 
those by Danthine (1978), Holthausen (1979), and Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980) to the 
forward-looking scenario, relaxing the simplifying assumptions used by Hey (1987). Optimal 
storage (and sales) behavior is completely characterized in the proof to Proposition I, and 
comparative statics follow easily from total differentiation of f0 - r0 [p0 + i'(I1)] = 0.7 
?Note that in the forward-looking scenario we cannot use jointly normally distributed prices to justify 
mean-variance analysis. The quantities stored after the cunent date (i.e., 12, ... , IT) are random but cannot follow a 
normal distribution because fmns do not store if f1 < r1 [p1 + t(O)]. 
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We turn now to the focus of this paper, i.e., the characterization of the optimal hedge. To 
this end, it is useful to rewrite one of the components of FOC (1.11) in an alternative way, 
namely:S 
Employing ( 1.15) and E1(M1+ 1 ') = M1', we can state FOC ( 1.11) as follows: 
Inspection of the sign of the covariance term in expression (1.16) will allow us to prove the results 
summarized in Propositions 2 and 3. To show Proposition 6, we will use the following model of 
cash price behavior: 
(1.17) p1 =a+ J3 p1_1 + e1, 0 s; J3 s; 1, e1 i.i.d. zero-mean random variable. 
Expression (1.17) nests the cases of serially independent prices (J3 = 0), random walk (J3 = 1), and 
autoregressive process of order 1 (0 < J3 < 1 ). In addition, by unbiased forward prices we will 
mean that forward prices are always unbiased, i.e., EtCPt+l) = f1, t = 0, ... , T-1. 
8Recall that for any pair of random variables x andy, E(x y) = E(x) E(y) + Cov(x. y). 
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PROPOSITION 2: MYOPIC STORAGE HEDGE. The optimal hedge for a myopic risk-averse 
firm that perceives the forward price to be unbiased is to (short) sell forward the total amount 
stored. This hedge is independent from the myopic firm's degree of risk aversion. 
Proof According to (1.16), at the optimum, [f0 - E0(p1)] and Cov[pl' E0(M1'1p1)] must bear 
equal signs because M1' > 0. In particular, Cov[pp E0(M1'1p1)] = 0 if f0 = E0(p1). For the 
myopic firm date 0 is T-1, and from (1.9) we have Ey_1(My'lpy) =My'· Then, 
()P (M 'I ) (1.18) -r-1 T Py =(I - F ) M "~ 0 as F ~I dpy T T-1 T T·1 T 
because My" < 0. But Py is monotonically increasing in Py and Ey_1 (My'lpy) is monotonically 
increasing (decreasing) in PT if Fy.1 > ( <) IT. Hence, applying Theorem 43 in Hardy, Littlewood, 
and P6lya (1967) we obtain 
In particular, if fy. 1 = Ey_1 (py), it must be true that Fy_1 =IT. Q.E.D. 
PROPOSffiON 3: FORWARD-LOOKING STORAGE HEDGE. (I) The optimal hedge for a 
forward-looking risk-aversefirm that perceives the forward price to be unbiased is not necessarily 
to sell forward the entire quantity stored. Furthermore, the optima/forward-looking hedge 
depends upon the firm's degree of risk aversion. 
(2) If the firm is constant absolute risk averse (CARA) and cash prices behave as in 
expression (1.17), then the optima/forward-looking hedge under unbiased forward prices is 
strictly smaller than the entire amount stored. 
II 
Proof We show only part (2) of Proposition 3 because it implies part (I). For a forward-looking 
CARA firm with cash prices behaving as in (1.17) and unbiased forward prices, we get 
where MT" equals U" < 0 evaluated at the optimum and Mt" denotes E1(M1+1") evaluated at the 
optimum. Expression (1.20') follows from (1.20) because the other terms in the right-hand side 
of (1.20) vanish (see Appendix B). 
Assume that I1 :5 Fa. Then d(M1'1p1)/dp1 > 0 because Ea(M1"1p1) < 0, (r1 - J3) > 0, and 
Ea(It+l M1"1p1) < 0.9 But if d(M1'1p1)/dp1 > 0 then Cov[p1, Ea(M1'1p1)] > 0, which violates FOC 
(1.16) under unbiased forward prices. Therefore, it must be true that I1 >Fa. Q.E.D. 
The results reported in Proposition 2 are analogous to those obtained by Holthausen (1979) 
and Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980) and demonstrate that our model is consistent with the 
standard literature. Our findings about the optimal forward-looking hedge (Proposition 3) reveal 
that full-hedge optimality under unbiased forward price is not a robust result From Propositions 2 
9The proof of Ea(l2 M1 "I p1) < 0 follows from the fact that 12 = 0 if f 1 S r 1 [p1 + i'(O) ], and 12 > 0 
otherwise (see proof of Proposition 1). Hence, 
Ea(l2 M 1 "I p1) = Ea[12 M 1 "I p1 <: f1/r1 - i'(O),] Proba[P1 <: f/r 1 - i'(O)] 
+ Eo[I2 M 1 "I p1 < f/r1 - i'(O)] Proba[p1 < f/r1 - i'(O)] 
= Ea[I2 M 1"1 p1 < f1/r1 - i'(O)] Proba[pl < f/r1 - i'(O)], 
where Prob{) is the probability of(·), given the information at date t Therefore, Ea(l2 M1"1 p1) > 0 (unless 
Proba[p1 < f/r1 - i'(O)] = 0}. The proof ofEa(lt+l ~"I p1) < 0 for I< t S T-1 is analogous. 
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and 3, it is clear that the simplicity of the optimal myopic hedge under unbiased forward price is 
attributable to the myopic firm assuming with certainty that whatever it stores now will be 
completely sold in the next trading time and that it will store nothing at the next date (i.e., 
I~T+l = 0). Also, the myopic firm does not plan to hedge at the next trading time (i.e., F1=T = 0). 
In contrast, the forward-looking firm assigns a positive probability to storing and/or trading 
forward at the next trading date. But next-date optimal storage and hedge are correlated with next-
date cash price, and therefore they serve as partial substitutes for current hedging. It is this 
substitution effect that leads to full-hedge suboptimality in the forward-looking scenario. 
An alternative interpretation of the full-hedge suboptimality result is that we have 
formalized a common behavioral pattern known as anticipatory hedging. The fum may operate in 
the forward market to speculate and/or to place two types of hedges, namely risk-avoidance and 
anticipatory hedges.IO If the forward price is unbiased, the firm does not speculate and trades 
forward only to hedge. The risk-avoidance hedge consists of selling current storage forward to 
reduce its price risk, whereas the anticipatory hedge is placed to avoid the price risk of next-date 
storage. Therefore, the risk-avoidance hedge is identical to current storage. In contrast, the size of 
the anticipatory hedge depends, among other factors, on the distribution of the random quantities 
stored and hedged at next-date, the agent's degree of risk aversion, and the joint distribution of 
random prices. Hence, the sum of risk-avoidance and anticipatory hedges generally differs from 
current storage and depends on the degree of risk aversion. This is true unless the fum currently 
knows exactly how much it will store and hedge at next-date, so next-date storage and hedge are 
nonrandom. The myopic case is an example of the latter situation in which next-date storage and 
hedge are known to be exactly zero (I~T+l = F1=T = 0). 
In Figure 1, we show the magnitudes of the optimal storage and hedging positions for a 
forward-looking fum at decision date T-2 (which corresponds to calendar time lo). In this 
example, it is assumed that prices at calendar times t1 and ~ (i.e., decision dates T-1 and T, 
1~-avoidance and anticipatory hedges are defined in Marshall (1989. p. !98). 
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respectively) have the discrete distributions reported in Table I. Optimal decisions are then found 
by numerical maximization of the expected value of utility, where the utility function is 
[- exp(- A. WT)]. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the storage cost function is quadratic 
[i(l1+1) = 0.001 ~+ll and that the interest rate is zero (i.e.,\=\= 1). Figure I illustrates the 
case of Pt, = 9 and unbiased forward price (i.e., flo = I 0). For this reasonable scenario, the 
magnitude of the optimal forward-looking hedge lies between 78 percent and 93 percent of the 
optimal storage for slightly and severely risk-averse decision makers (A= 0.0001 and A= 0.01, 
respectively)." This result contrasts with that of the optimal myopic hedge, which equals 100 
percent of the optimal storage, irrespective of the degree of absolute risk aversion. 
The general suboptimality of the full hedge under unbiased forward prices is an important 
result. It is widely accepted that full hedging is optimal when the forward price is unbiased. The 
full hedge is appealing because of its simplicity. Also, its normative content is easy and broadly 
applicable because it makes complete abstraction of the agent's degree of risk aversion. Our model 
shows that, despite these appealing characteristics, full-hedge optimality depends crucially upon 
assuming myopic behavior and/or independence of output and material input prices. 
Given the previous discussion, it is easier to understand why the full hedge overestimates 
the optimal forward-looking hedge under unbiased forward prices when the firm is CARA and 
cash prices behave as in (1.17). The value of ending inventories is negatively associated with 
input costs for next period storage; therefore, next-date storage reduces the cash price risk 
associated with current storage: revenue from current storage will be low ifp1 is low, but then the 
firm will be able to buy material input to store at a low price, thereby partly offsetting the lower 
revenue. This means that next-date storage is an imperfect substitute for current hedging (when 
viewed in the context of multiperiod profitability), so that the hedge required to achieve a certain 
level of reduction in next-date cash price risk is smaller than it would be if next-date storage did not 
contribute to risk reduction. 
liAs A.~, the optimal hedge converges asymptotically to 489.58 from below. 
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In general, for CARA firms we can express CJE0(M1 'lp1)/CJp1 as 
where ht+1(pt+11.U.) is the conditional density function ofpt+l and ft+l' given .U.· Expression 
(1.21) is helpful in that it allows us to separate clearly the two main components of the optimal 
forward-looking hedge. The first term in the right-hand side of (1.21) is the risk-avoidance 
component, whereas the other terms are the anticipatory component The risk-avoidance term 
vanishes ifF 0 = 11. The anticipatory component can be further divided into direct and indirect 
anticipation terms (i.e., the second and the remaining terms in the right-hand side of (1.21), 
respectively). The direct anticipation component is due to the effect of next-date storage (12). The 
direct anticipation term is strictly positive, irrespective of risk attitudes or price distributions, and 
requires a long hedge (F0 < 0) to equal zero. Finally, the indirect anticipation component involves 
the impact on current hedging attributable to the interaction between the risk attitude and the price 
distribution, and it has an ambiguous sign. 
The indirect anticipation component vanishes when forward prices are unbiased and cash 
prices behave as in expression ( 1.17). If forward prices at future decision dates are allowed to be 
biased, the optimal forward-looking CARA hedge may be larger than the amount stored, even if 
the current forward price is unbiased. This may happen because next-date cash price indirectly 
affects the current hedge through its relationship with next-date forward price. The sign and 
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magnitude of this indirect effect depends on the size of the next-date hedge, which in turn may be 
positive or negative and large enough to cause the current hedge to exceed the amount stored. 
It is interesting to note that when cash prices behave as in (1.17), the optimal forward-
looking hedge under unbiased forward prices is strictly negative if nothing is stored (e.g., 
F0 < 11 = 0), and the forward-looking firm establishes a long forward position. In contrast, the 
optimal myopic hedge in the same situation is F0 = 0. Tills is an interesting result because it 
explains the existence of anticipatory hedging under unbiased forward prices without resorting to 
any ad-hoc assumptions. In the standard myopic framework, anticipatory hedging is modeled by 
assuming that the firm currently knows exactly how much it will store and hedge at the next date. 
This assumption is clearly inconsistent. If the firm is myopic, we have shown that it is suboptimal 
to expect next-date sales to be anything less than beginning stocks. If the firm is forward-looking 
but knows next-date storage and hedge with certainty, then either prices are nonstochastic or the 
firm does not behave optimally. 
A Productive Competitive Firm 
The main results discussed in the preceding section were obtained by assuming the cash 
flow presented in expression ( 1.2) and are attributable to the contemporaneous relationship 
between revenue and input cost at each date. In this section, we will show that similar conclusions 
apply to firms characterized by less restrictive cash flows. The complications that arise from 
allowing for random input prices in a forward-looking context are attributable to the possibilities of 
stochastic production and/or input substitution. Hence, we can apply our basic model to other 
types of cash flows by constraining the production function to be nonstochastic and such that 
inputs with random prices cannot be substituted. 
It is straightforward to extend the analysis performed in the previous section to competitive 
firms with the Leontief-type short-run production function 
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where Qt denotes production of final good at date t, Qt ;::: 0, CJ; represents material input use, <Pis a 
fixed input-output coefficient (<I>> 0), Vt is a vector of nonmaterial inputs, and q(·) is a strictly 
concave production function. Output Qt cannot be sold before date t+ I; in other words, the firm 
starts production at timet and finishes output right before date t+ I. 
According to (2.1 ), adding <P units of material input increases production by one unit over 
the range in which the vector of nonmaterial inputs does not constrain production. If enough units 
of material input are added, the set of nonmaterial inputs eventually becomes binding and 
production cannot increase. The fact that there is no substitutability between material input and 
q(·) does not mean that substitution among the nonmaterial inputs in vector Vt is prevented. For 
example, it may be feasible to substitute capital for labor in wheat milling, even though 
substitutability of wheat for either of these other two inputs combined or alone is negligible for all 
practical purposes. Note also that material input becomes nonbinding as <P tends to zero, resulting 
in a standard production function q(· ). In other words, the standard production function is nested 
in (2.1). Storage, transportation, refining and/or purifying of raw materials (e.g., oil, sugar, and 
metals), grain milling (e.g., wheat and rice), oilseed crushing, alloy preparation, energy 
generation, meat packing, and livestock production are examples of processes that comply with 
this Leontief function. In the farm sector, feedlot, hog, and poultry production are but some of the 
production processes that can be modeled by this function with reasonable accuracy. 
Diewert (1971) has shown that the cost function dual to (2.1) is 
where Cis variable cost, st is material input price, cO is a strictly convex nonmaterial cost 
function such that c'O > 0, and vt is a vector of nonmaterial input prices. We will assume that 
nonmaterial input prices are constant, and we will simply write c(Qt) instead of c(Qt; vt) because 
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we are not concerned with nonmaterial input prices. Assuming that material input price is 
stochastic whereas that nonmaterial input prices are constant is not unrealistic because in many 
situations material input constitutes the largest share of variable cost. Also, nonmaterial input 
prices are generally less volatile, and substitutability among nonmaterial inputs should cause 
variable cost changes far less pronounced than those caused by material input price changes. 
Because output and material input prices are different from each other in this scenario, to 
make the analysis more interesting we will hypothesize that forward markets exist for both output 
and material input. We will denote the forward price and forward position corresponding to 
material input by~ and ~,respectively. Then, the cash flow for a firm with the Leontief 
production function (2.1) can be represented by 
and the optimal decisions at the current date satisfy 
where: dt = (Qt, Ft, F;) if 0 ~ t < T, dr = (Qp 0, 0), Qt ;:: 0, 
Pt = (pt, st, ft' ~), 
t = 0, !, ... , T-1, 
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Terminal wealth and cash flows are given by expressions (1.1) and (2.3), respectively. 
To distinguish the fum represented by cash flow (1.2) from the fum represented by cash 
flow (2.3), we will refer to the latter as a manufacturing fum. The analysis of optimal production 
and hedging for the manufacturing firm can be performed by using similar procedures as those 
used for the speculative storing firm. To avoid repetition, we outline the main results here and 
focus on the rna jor behavioral differences between speculative storing and manufacturing fums. 
It can be shown that optimal production at the terminal date is zero, yielding the maximum 
value function 
The FOCs for any date preceding the terminal time are 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
The most important results regarding this type of fum are obtained by means of 
expressions (2.6) through (2.9). These results are summarized as Propositions 4, 5, and 6, which 
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are the respective counterparts of Propositions I, 2, and 3. To prove Proposition 6, we will use 
the following expression regarding the relationship between output and material input cash prices: 
(2.1 0) st = y + B Pt + ut, ut i.i.d. random variable. 
PROPOSillON 4: PRODUCI10N BEHAVIOR. In the presence of an output forward market, 
optimal production for a risk-averse mamifacturing firm is independent from the subjective joint 
distribution of random variables ,from the decision maker's degree of risk aversion, and from the 
optimal hedging decision. If positive, optimal production is such that discounted current output 
forward price equals (weighted) current material input cash price plus marginal production cost. 
These results hold for both myopic andforward-lookingfirms. 
Proof By substituting FOC (2.8) into FOC (2.7) and rearranging, we obtain 
Therefore, 
a. If f0 $ r0 [<I> s0 + c'(O)], then Oo = 0. 
b. If f0 > r0 [<I> s0 + c'(O)], then ~ > 0 and f0 = r0 [<I> s0 + c'(0o)J. Q.E.D. 
PROPOSillON 5: MYOPIC PRODUCI10N HEDGE. The optimal hedge for a myopic 
mamifacturing risk-averse firm that perceives output and material input forward prices to be 
simultaneously unbiased is to sell the entire production in the output forward market and to sell 
nothing in the material input forward market. This hedge is independent from the myopic firm's 
degree of risk aversion. 
Proof Rewrite FOCs (2.8) and (2.9) as 
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kt(st, ft, t;l_a,_1, Pt) is the conditional density function of st' ft and t;, given .a,_1 and Pt• and 
1/Pt' ft, t;'lpt-1' st) is the conditional density function of Pt• ft and(, given .a,_1 and st. 
If the firm is myopic and both forward prices are simultaneously unbiased, we need 
Cov[pT, ET_1 (MT'IpT)] = Cov[~, ET_1 (MT'I~)] = 0. This is satisfied if FT_1 = QT_1 and ~-1 = 0 
because such a hedge yields MT' independent from both PT and sT. Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION 6: FORWARD-LOOKING PRODUCI10N HEDGE. (1) The optimal hedge for 
a manufacturing forward-looking risk-aversejirm is generally different from the optimal myopic 
hedge. Furthermore, the optima/forward-looking hedge depends on the firm's degree of risk 
aversion. 
(2) If the manufacturing forward-looking firm is CARA and output and material input cash 
prices behave as in ( 1.17) and (2 .1 0 ), then the optimal hedge under unbiased forward prices 
consists of buying forward contracts of material input and, if cash prices are unrelated ( 8 = 0) and 
serially uncorrelated ( f3 = 0 ), selling the entire production in the forward market. 
Proof See Appendix B. 
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Proposition 4 confirms the robustness of the separation result, showing that it applies to a 
cost function that characterizes many production processes, even when the fum is forward-
looking. It is also important to note that separation holds irrespective of the existence of a forward 
market for material input. Propositions 5 and 6 highlight the differences between myopic and 
forward-looking hedging behavior and confirm the weakness of the full-hedge optimality result 
Even for the myopic case, it will generally be true that F0 #~and F~ .._ 0 simultaneously 
if output or material input forward prices (or both) are biased. This can be seen from 
()P (M 'I ) (2.14) '-1"·1 T Pr = (Q - F ) P_ (M "lp ) ~ T-1 T-1 '-1"-1 T T 
For example, if the output forward price is unbiased but the material input forward price is biased, 
FOCs require that ClE.r_1(Mr'1Sr)ldSr # 0 and ClE.r.1CMr'1prl!dPr = 0. This will generally mean a 
nonzero forward position in the input market (F~_1 # 0) and an output hedge different from total 
production (Fr_1 # Qr_1). In fact, a full output hedge (Fr_1 = Qr_1) does not yield 
ClE.r_1(Mr'1prl/dpr = 0 if n;-_1 .._ 0 unless Pr and 5r are independently distributed. 
Proposition 6 clarifies our previous discussion about the storage case. With unbiased 
forward prices, and independent and serially uncorrelated cash prices (8 = 0 and ~ = 0), the 
optimum hedge consists of the risk-avoidance hedge (F0 = ~) and the anticipatory hedge (fb < 0). 
In terms of payoff with respect to alternative forward prices, the net effect of both forward 
positions (F0, FoJ is similar to a less than fully hedged output position. In the real world, 
however, having forward markets for both output and material input is the exception rather than the 
rule. Proposition 7 summarizes some important results concerning the situation in which either the 
output forward market or the material input forward market is missing. 
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PROPOSffiON 7: FORWARD-LOOKING PRODUCTION HEDGE IN THE ABSENCE OF 
FORWARD MARKETS. Assume thnt the manzifacturing firm is CARA, that material input and 
output cash prices behave as in ( 1.17) and (2.10) with 0 < 8 ~ f3!cP, and that forward prices are 
unbiased. Then: 
(I) The optimal forward-looking hedge in the absence of a forward market for material input is 
strictly less thnn the entire current production. 
(2) The optimal forward-looking hedge in the absence of a forward market for output is strictly less 
thnn the amount of material input imbedded in the entire current production. 
Proof See Appendix C. 
Proposition 7 reminds us that the standard full hedge optimality result depends crucially on 
(i) the finn being myopic, or on (ii) output cash prices being serially uncorrelated and output and 
material input cash prices being independent from each other. Full-hedge suboptimality under 
forward-looking behavior and unbiased forward prices is important and especially relevant for 
empirical work. Many studies have been conducted to obtain empirical estimates of the "optimal 
hedge" when there is a futures rather than a forward market [e.g., Ederington (1979), Anderson 
and Danthine (1980), Cecchetti, Cumby, and Figlewski (1988), Myers and Thompson (1989)]. 
The normative content of these studies is usually emphasized on the basis that the optimal hedge 
under unbiased futures prices is independent of the decision maker's degree of risk aversion 
[Bailin (1983), Benninga, Eldor, and Zilcha (1984)]. Our results suggest that this would be the 
case only if (i) the agent is myopic or if (ii) output cash prices are serially uncorrelated and output 
and material input cash prices_ are unrelated to each other. 
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Conclusions 
In this study, we have shown that separation between production (or speculative storage) 
and hedging is a robust result because it holds even if firms are forward-looking. In the presence 
of forward markets, optimal production (storage) for a forward-looking frrm is identical to an 
otherwise equivalent myopic fum. Optimal production (storage) is determined solely by 
nonrandom factors and is independent from the agent's price expectations and degree of risk 
aversion. 
In contrast, full-hedge optimality under unbiased forward prices holds only if (i) the 
decision maker is myopic or if (ii) output cash prices are serially uncorrelated and output and 
material input cash prices are independent from each other. Full hedging is suboptimal when the 
firm is forward-looking and (i) output cash prices are serially correlated or (ii) output and material 
input prices are contemporaneously related. In this instance, suboptimality arises because the fum 
foresees that at next decision date it will stay in the market and it will take decisions based on the 
observed values of the relevant random variables. Hence, next-date decisions are random and 
affect the current risks faced by the fum and therefore will have an impact on the optimal current 
hedge. 
Most real-world situations are characterized by the absence of either a forward market for 
(a) output or (b) material input If the forward-looking fum exhibits constant absolute risk 
aversion, forward prices are unbiased, and some realistic conditions hold regarding the behavior of 
cash prices, the fum will hedge less than its entire current production under case (b), and will 
hedge less than the material input embedded in its entire current production under case (a). 
Our results may help explain why fums do not fully hedge, even when there is empirical 
evidence that futures prices are generally unbiased. Also, full-hedge suboptimality under forward-
looking behavior and unbiased forward prices raises questions about the normative properties of 
studies concerned with the empirical estimation of optimal myopic hedges in the presence of 
futures rather than forward markets. 
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Appendix A. Derivation of FOC (1.10) 
The FOCs corresponding to the Lagrangian for 0::;; t <Tare (AI) plus (1.11) and (1.12). 
(AI) 
But note that 
(A2) 
(A3) 
(A4) 
(A4') 
()It+ I 
- =-1, 
()pt 
where (A4') is obtained by using expressions (AI) through (A3). It follows from (A4') that 
(A5) ClMt+l {rt+l ··· rT-1 [rt Wt + (ft- Pt+l) Ft]; It+!; 11;+1} 
()It+ I 
Substitution of (A2) and (A5) into FOC (AI) and rearrangement yields expression (1.10). 
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 6 
If the finn is CARA, forward prices are unbiased, and output and material input prices 
behave as in (1.17) and (2.10), we have 
(B2) 
(B3) 
Under unbiased forward prices, FOCs (2.12) and (2.13) require Cov[pl' Ea(M1'1p1)] = 
Cov[s1, Ea(M1'1s1)] = 0. Therefore, from (Bl) it must also be true that Cov[ul' Ea(M1'1u1)] = 0. 
Assume that 0::; ~· Then Cl(M1'1u1)/Clu1 > 0 because Ea(M1"1u1) < 0 and 
Ea(Q1 M 1"1u1) < 0, thus implying that Cov[u1, Ea(M1'1u1)] > 0. But this contradicts the 
requirement that Cov[u1, Ea(M1'1u1)] = 0. Hence, it must be true that 0 > F~. 
Assume that~<(>) Fa· If~= 1i = 0, Cl(M1'1p1)/Clp1 > (<) 0 and therefore 
Cov[p1, Ea(M1'1p1)] > (<) 0, which contradicts the necessary condition that Cov[pl' Ea(M1'1p1)] 
= 0. Hence, it must be true that~= Fa. 
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Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 7 
In the absence of a forward market for material input, the analysis can be performed by 
setting F: = 0, in which case only FOCs (2.7) and (2.12) apply. Then, we have 
(Cl) 
Following the arguments in the proof of Proposition 6, we must have Oo > F0 if 0 < 8 <: ~/<!>. 
Similarly, if there is no forward market for output, Ft must be set equal to zero and only 
FOCs (2.7) and (2.13) apply. In this instance, 
(C2) 
(C3) 
Assume <4J ~ 8 ~· Then a(M1'1p1)/i)p1 > 0 and a(M1'1u1)/au1 > 0, which implies that Cov[s1, 
E0(M1'1s1)] > 0. But if Cov[s1, E0(M 1'1s1)] > 0, then FOC (2.12) cannot hold. Hence, Oo > 8 F~ 
<: ~/<P ~ <: F~<P, implying that <P Oo = ~ > F~. 
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Figure 1. Optimal storage and forward-looking hedge under unbiased forward prices 
31 
Table I. Probability distribution of prices at dates t1 and tz 
Date t1 Date tz 
Event Pt, ft Probability Event Pt2 
Probability 
I conditional 
on event at t1 
I 13 12.5 0.0625 1 14.5 0.25 
1 13 12.5 0.0625 2 11.5 0.50 
1 13 12.5 0.0625 3 9.5 0.25 
2 13 11.5 0.1250 4 14.5 0.25 
2 13 11.5 0.1250 5 11.5 0.50 
2 13 11.5 0.1250 6 9.5 0.25 
3 13 10.5 0.0625 7 14.5 0.25 
3 13 10.5 0.0625 8 11.5 0.50 
3 13 10.5 0.0625 9 9.5 0.25 
4 10 11 0.1250 10 13 0.25 
4 10 11 0.1250 11 10 0.50 
4 10 11 0.1250 12 7 0.25 
5 10 10 0.2500 13 13 0.25 
5 10 10 0.2500 14 10 0.50 
5 10 10 0.2500 15 7 0.25 
6 10 9 0.1250 16 13 0.25 
6 10 9 0.1250 17 10 0.50 
6 10 9 0.1250 18 7 0.25 
7 7 9.5 0.0625 19 11.5 0.25 
7 7 9.5 0.0625 20 8.5 0.50 
7 7 9.5 0.0625 21 5.5 0.25 
8 7 8.5 0.1250 22 11.5 0.25 
8 7 8.5 0.1250 23 8.5 0.50 
8 7 8.5 0.1250 24 5.5 0.25 
9 7 7.5 0.0625 25 11.5 0.25 
9 7 7.5 0.0625 26 8.5 0.50 
9 7 7.5 0.0625 27 5.5 0.25 
